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DUE PROCESS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS:
A COMPARISON WITH JUVENILE AND
MENTAL INCOMPETENCY REQUIREMENTS

A New York father and his mistress were jailed for almost two years for
refusing to produce his child at a custody proceeding.' A law that would have

limited imprisonment for civil contempt to one year, proposed as a result of

this case, was vetoed by the Governor of New York. 2 On the other hand, an

alleged member of organized crime was released by the New Jersey Supreme
Court after being incarcerated for almost five years for refusing to testify

before the State Commission of Investigation.

3

These events indicate a need

to reevaluate the due process afforded a civil contemnor, for just as the

controversy over a jury trial for criminal contemnors4 raged for years, 5 the
question of coercive imprisonment may have reached the boiling point. This

Note will examine the principles of civil contempt, comparing them with the
due process standards evolved in juvenile delinquency adjudications and
mental competency determinations. Due to the inherent difficulty in clearly
delineating civil and criminal contempts, any analysis of civil contempt
necessitates references to its criminal counterpart. Although these areas are
not carbon copies of civil contempt, factual similarities exist, and their due
process requirements are germane since the loss of personal liberty is ultimately at stake in each.
I.

PRINCIPLES

OF CIVIL CONTEMPT

Civil contempt sanctions are said to be coercive in nature. 6 Their purpose

is "remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. ' 7 They are to be
1. People ex rel. Feldman v. Warden, 46 App. Div. 2d 256, 36? N.Y.S.2d 171 (Ist Dep't
1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 846, 331 N.E.2d 691, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975).
2. S. 6791-A, N.Y. Sen., 198th Sess. (1975).
3. Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 343 A.2d 744 (1975) (per curiam). Gerardo Catena was
released without ever testifying.
4. The Supreme Court, in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), held that federal
courts must guarantee a jury trial for serious offenses. A six month sentence delineated serious
and petty offenses. Id. at 379-80. This principle was applied to the states under the fourteenth
amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Finally, in Bloom v- Illinois, 391
U.S. 194, 211 (1968), the Court ordered a jury trial for a criminal contemnor sentenced to two
years imprisonment. Applying the Cheff rationale, all sentences over six months warrant a trial
by jury. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 153 (196S). Subsequent
criminal contempt decisions have adhered to the six month distinction. Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1969) (if a specific penalty is authorized, the maximum potential penalty is
determinative of the need for a jury trial); Malta v. Whitmore, SOS F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) (since contemnor faced less than six months in jail, he had no
right to a jury trial).
5. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1966) (Douglas. J.. dissenting); United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165, 219 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
6. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); 47 Minn. L. Rev. 907, 903-09 (1963).
7.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (19111; see Comment, The
Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi, L. Rev. 120, 123 (1965).
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distinguished" from criminal contempt sentences which are "punitive [in
nature], to vindicate the authority of the court." 9 However, distinction of
contempt by the "character and purpose"' 10 of the punishment has not always
been successful, and as the Court noted in Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., II
"[i]t may not be always easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either
one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both."' 12 The
courts seem, at times, to have lost sight of the essentially remedial nature of
civil contempt,13 that it should serve "only the purposes of the complainant,
4
and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public."'
Thus, punishment for criminal contempt generally takes the form of a
determinate sentence, to vindicate past affronts to the court, while civil
contempt imposes a conditional sanction, contingent on the contemnor's
willingness to purge himself.' This aspect of civil contempt brings forth the
time worn cry that contemnors carry "the keys of their prison in their own
17
pockets,"' 6 a phrase which permeates the law of civil contempt.
Civil contempt orders are issued for a number of reasons. During a trial's
preliminary proceedings, the complainant, frustrated by the action or inaction
of the defendant, may seek relief from the court in the form of a civil
contempt order.' 5 Contempt sanctions are also frequently employed to coerce
8.

For a historical analysis of the problems in distinguishing civil and criminal contempt, see

Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 44 (1961).
9. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); see Katz v. Murtagh, 28
N.Y.2d 234, 239, 269 N.E.2d 816, 818-19, 321 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108 (1971).
10. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); see 32 Mo. L. Rev. 586
(1967).
11. 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
12. Id. at 329. For a discussion of the similarity and confusion between civil and criminal
contempt, see R. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power 46-67 (1)63).
13. See, e.g., McTigue v. New London Educ. Ass'n, 164 Conn. 348, 321 A.2d 462 (1973)
(court reversed civil contempt conviction and ordered a new trial on the contempt issue due to the
clearly punitive characteristic of the sentences).
14. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939); see Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780, 787 (1943).
15. The contemnors in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), were sentenced to two
years in prison - -or until the further order' " of the district court, for refusing to testify before a
grand jury despite grants of immunity. Id. at 366. Their conduct was deemed "criminal
contempt" despite the coercive nature of the sentence and their ability to purge themselves. Id. at
369-70. The Supreme Court, recognizing the contempt as civil, vacated the judgment since the
sentence could have extended beyond the life of the grand jury, making compliance impossible.
Id. at 371.
16. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902); see R. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power 5859 (1963).
17. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 331 (1947) (Black &
Douglas, J.J., concurring & dissenting); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442
(1911); United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1973).
18. IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)
(refusal to produce documents during discovery); United States v. Handler, 476 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
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obedience with a court's final order once the case has been decided.' 9 Despite
its remedial nature, some courts have been reluctant to impose civil contempt
orders and have recognized the need to explore alternative courses.2 0
Once the defendant has been given notice, 2' there is a hearing at which the
complainant must prove noncompliance with the court's order.22 This is
usually accomplished simply by showing the existence of the order and the
defendant's noncompliance. 2 3 The burden 2 4then shifts, and the potential
contemnor must prove inability to comply.
The complainant generally must sustain a "clear and convincing"2Z5 burden
to sustain a finding of contempt, but standards vary from requiring "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" 2 6 to "a preponderance of the evidence.1 2 7 No
1973) (refusal to testify before the grand jury despite immunity); People ex rel. Feldman v.
Warden, 46 App. Div. 2d 256, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 846, 331
N.E.2d 691, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975) (failure to produce child in custody proceeding).
19. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759 (Alas. 1971) (failure to pay child support); Village of
Great Neck Estates v. Rose, 279 App. Div. 671, 108 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 1951) (mem.), appeal
dismissed, 303 N.Y. 904, 105 N.E.2d 491 (1952) (violation of zoning ordinance).
20. California Artificial Stone Paxing Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885); Kane v.
Smith, 56 Wash. 2d 799, 803, 355 P.2d 827, 831 (1960); see Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 273-74 (1971); Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil
Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 120, 128-29 (1965) (coercive imprisonment should be avoided if
ordinary attachment or garnishment would protect the complainant's rights or if pleadings may
be struck, or facts established against the uncooperative defendant).
21. Failure to provide proper notice may nullify the court's finding. See Pereira v. Pereira, 33
N.Y.2d 301, 308, 319 N.E.2d 413, 417-18, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148, 153-54 (1974).
22. Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alas. 1971); Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 343 A.2d
744 (1975) (per curiam); Ingraham v. Maurer, 39 App. Div. 2d 258, 260, 334 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (3d
Dep't 1972).
23. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75 (1948); Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 361-62,
364-65 (1929); Ex parte Carpenter, 36 Cal. App. 2d 274, 97 P.2d 476 (1939).
24. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75-76 (1948); Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alas.
1971); In re Hildreth, 28 App. Div. 2d 290, 294, 284 N.Y.S.2d 755, 760 (1st Dep't 1967); see
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 266 (1971). But see Catena v.
Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 227, 343 A.2d 744, 746 (1975) (per curiam) (imprisoned contemno's burden
was to show not that he was unable to comply, but that imprisonment had lost its coercive
impact).
25. Confronted with a bankrupt who was ordered to turn over his financial records, the Court
found "clear and' convincing" evidence necessary to find the man in contempt of the order. Oriel
v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929).
26. Quezada v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 2d S28, 340 P.2d 1018 (1959). The court
termed civil contempt proceedings as "special proceedings" in which the contemnor was entitled
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and "the same protection of his constitutional rights as he
would be [afforded] in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 529, 340 P.2d at 1019.
27. Alaska utilized this approach, but found the contemnor entitled to a trial by jury.
Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alas. 1971). The Eighth Circuit on the other hand, seemed
to reject both "clear and convincing" and "preponderance of the evidence." finding a "heavy
burden" necessary. Such a burden requires a "'degree of certainty' . . . which leaves no fair
ground of doubt," and falls somewhere short of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1943); see Comment, The Coercive Function of
Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 120, 122 (1965).
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Once found in conpresumption of innocence attaches to the contemnor.
tempt, the defendant may be fined, 29 imprisoned, 30 or both. 3 1 If imprisoned,
the contemnor is entitled to review, 3 2 but he retains the burden of proving his
inability to comply. Moreover, there is no right to a jury trial. The Supreme
Court has found that indictment and jury trial are not constitutionally
required for civil3 contempt commitments, due to their remedial and con3
ditional nature.

At a certain point, however, the purpose of the sentence tends to become
obscured as coercion fails to produce results. In Maggio v. Zeitz, 34 for
example, the Court considered the question of a bankrupt who failed to
comply with a turnover order, and was consequently imprisoned. The Court
noted that " '[w]here [the confinement] has failed, and where a reasonable
interval of time has supplied the previous defect in the evidence, and has
made sufficiently certain what was doubtful before, namely, 3the
bankrupt's
5
inability to obey the order .

. . .'

he should be released.

A procedure resulting in the incarceration of a person not convicted for a
crime raises serious due process questions. The Supreme Court has rejected
summary imprisonment of more than six months in criminal contempt cases,
despite long held precedent 36 justifying it as an appropriate deterrent to
defiance of judicial power. Similarly, the incarceration of a juvenile without
substantial due process safeguards has been held unconstitutional, despite the
commendable goals of the juvenile justice system. 37 Confinement of the
mentally incompetent must be justified by some reasonable relationship to the
ends the confinement seeks to accomplish, 38 notwithstanding society's interest
28. The Court, in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911),
recognized that the presumption of innocence applies to criminal contempt. No such presumption
is afforded the civil contemnor. Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
29. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (district court fined union leader
$10,000 and union $3,500,000).
30. See, e.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (incarcerated for nearly three years).
31. See, e.g., Ditomasso v. Loverro, 242 App. Div. 190, 273 N.Y.S. 76 (2d Dep't 1934)
(contemnor fined $250 and jailed until he consented to be examined by plaintiffs attorney).
32. The New York Judiciary Law provides for review, every ninety days, before the court
that ordered imprisonment. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 774(2) (McKinney 1975). Appellate review,
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501 (McKinney 1963), and habeas corpus proceedings are also available. Id.
§§ 7001-04. See Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
1038, 1040-42 (1970).
33. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966).
34. 333 U.S. 56 (1948).
35. Id.at 72.
36. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 190-93 (1958).
37. The juvenile system was designed to protect young offenders from the harsh environment
of the criminal justice process. It was hoped that by providing a more informal setting, presided
over by an understanding judge, the goal of rehabilitation would be more readily attainable. The
Supreme Court was always cognizant of the system's "idealistic hopes" when it was attacked on
due process grounds. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971).
38. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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in treating and segregating these people. These proceedings are relevant to
civil contempt because they demonstrate a willingness on the part of the
courts to adjust requisite due process standards in light of the individual's
right to personal liberty.
II. ANALOGOUS PROCEEDINGS
A. Juvenile Deliquuency Adjudications
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision of In re Gault,39 the adjudication of a
minor as a delinquent had been "civil"-not criminal, and as such not subject
to criminal due process requirements despite the possible loss of personal
liberty. This procedure reflected a desire to protect children from the adult
criminal justice system and to shift the emphasis from punishment to rehabilitation. 4 1 Because of their inherently vulnerable nature, minors were thought
to be better served if kept out of the mainstream of criminal justice. This
idea, although benevolent, "frequently resulted .. .in arbitrariness," depriv-

ing juveniles of "fundamental rights" which constituted a "denial of due
42
process."
In Gault, the defendant had been sentenced on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence, ' 43 and faced the possibility of confinement for six years
in a state industrial school. 44 Emphasizing that the benefits of the present
juvenile system "will not be impaired by constitutional domestication,"4' the
Court held that a minor was entitled to notice, 46 the right to confront and
examine witnesses, 4 7 legal representation, 4 8 and the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. 49 All these rights were found to be so
integral to due process, "the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom," 5 0 that the Court could not disregard them "because of the
'
feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience."'
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40. Id. at 17; see Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Ketcham,
Guidelines from Gault Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 Va. L. Rev 1700, 1708
(1967).
41. 387 U.S. at 15-16. Despite the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court system, the
sanctions applied still resulted in loss of liberty. See Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile
Proceedings: Gault Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 Mich. L. Rev, 567, 575 (1970).
42. 387 U.S. at 18-19.
43. Id. at 11 n.7.
44. Fifteen year old Gerald Gault was committed " 'for the period of his minority [that is,
until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law.' " Id. at 7-8. One may surmise that
release through due process would occur upon a showing of good behavior or rehabilitation.
45. Id.at 22.
46. The notice required was "of the sort . . . which would be deemed constitutionally
adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding." Id. at 33.
47. Id. at 57 n.98.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Id. at 50. For a discussion of the practical effects that Gault had on the juvenile courts,
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In re Winship5 2 expanded the rights of juveniles. A twelve year old boy
was committed to a training school for an initial period of eighteen months,
subject to annual extensions until his eighteenth birthday. 53 This determination was made on the basis of the "preponderance of the evidence.154 The
Court considered whether due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 55 Noting that the reasonable doubt standard increases certainty,
56
strengthens public confidence and guarantees the presumption of innocence,
the Court deplored imprisonment on " 'the strength of the same evidence as
would suffice in a civil case,' ",57 and again rejected the civil label of
convenience. 58 Rejecting the argument that the reasonable doubt standard
would disable the juvenile system,

9

the standard was "explicitly" 60 held to be

an essential of due process and fair treatment in a juvenile proceeding.
However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,6 1 the Court found that a jury trial
was not required in the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 62 Nonetheless, the Court emphasized the futility of a "wooden approach" 63 that relied on the catchwords "civil" and "criminal." An examination of the juvenile justice system showed poorly trained and unqualified
judges, 64 lack of funds, and other shortcomings. 65 Consequently, the Court
admitted that "[p]erhaps [the] ultimate disillusionment [with the juvenile
justice system] will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to
give impetus to it." 66 Implicit in the Court's discussion was an attempt to
balance the individual's rights with the goals of society. The Court wished to
maintain the uniqueness of the juvenile court system and to avoid
placing
'67
"the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process."
see Alper, The Children's Court at Three Score and Ten: Will it Survive Gault?, 34 Albany L.
Rev. 46 (1969).
52. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
53. Id. at 360.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
397
Id.

& n.2.
at 359; see 39 Fordham L. Rev. 121 (1970).
U.S. at 362-64.
at 363; see 46 Notre Dame Law. 373, 383-84 (1971).

58. 397 U.S. at 365-66. The civil label had been used to justify the employment of civil
standards in essentially criminal juvenile adjudications. Id.
59. Id. at 366; see 16 Vill. L. Rev. 352, 355-56 (1970).
60. 397 U.S. at 364.
61. 403 U.S. 528 (1971); see 24 Vand. L. Rev. 1281 (1971).
62. 403 U.S. at 545.
63. Id. at 541.
64. Id. at 534, 544 & n.4.
65. Id. at 544-45 & n.5. The Court relied heavily on the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime, for factual support. Id.
66. Id. at 551. The Court encouraged states to experiment further for possible solutions to the
juvenile justice problem. Id. at 547. State positions on jury trials for delinquents are categorized
in the opinion. Id. at 548-49.
67. Id. at 547.
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B.

Mental Competency Determinations
The principles of due process developed in the juvenile area have been
applied to confinement for purposes of determining mental competency. A
defendant sentenced to one year for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor was committed to a mental institution for the duration of his sentence
pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. 68 However the confinement was
renewable for five year periods without the benefit of a jury trial-a safeguard
afforded persons not committed under the Sex Crimes Act. In holding that
this constituted a denial of equal protection, the Supreme Court spoke of the
'69
necessity of a jury trial to "justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.
70
In the same year, the Court in Jackson v. Indiana held that a person
could not be committed to a mental institution almost indefinitely on the
premise that such person was not capable of standing trial. Summary commitments of this kind are only to last for a "reasonable" time, sufficient to
determine whether there is a "substantial probability" that the person will be
able to stand trial in "the forseeable future." '71 This holding was based on the
Court's statemenf that "At the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
72
which the individual is committed."
73
Using this test to gauge due process, the Court in McNeil v. Director
considered the case of a convicted criminal defendant who refused to cooperate with psychiatrists attempting to evaluate his mental condition, and
consequently spent six years in a Maryland mental institution. The Court
rejected the analogy to a stubborn civil contemnor, and declined to examine
the parameters of civil contempt in this context. 74 The prisoner's release was
68. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 506 (1972). Pursuant to the Act, the trial
court found
that the crime was "probably motivated by desire for sexual excitement." Id. at 506-07.
69. Id. at 509. 'IT]he jury serves the critical function of introducing into the process a lay
judgment, reflecting values generally held in the community, concerning the kinds of potential
harm that justify the State in confining a person ...."Id.; see Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966).
70. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
71. Id. at 738.

72. Id.A "rule of reasonableness" was urged for pretrial confinement. Such confinement
cannot be imposed if it would result in indefinite loss of liberty. Id. at 733 see Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 471-73 (1967). The Court in Jatkson found it
"unnecessary" to reach the petitioner's eighth amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment
resulting from indefinite confinement. 406 U.S. at 739. The twenty year confinement of a
defendant who was determined insane and unable to stand trial was found to be cruel and
unusual in United States ex rel. Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 6S (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The cruel and unusual argument has been made in the civil contempt context. See Comment,
Incarceration For Civil Contempt: An Asserted Eighth Amendment Challenge Faces A Semantical Defense, 11 San Diego L. Rev. 1026 (1974).
73. 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); see Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13

Santa Clara Law. 560, 565 (1973).
74. 407 U.S. at 251. But see Williams v. Director, - Md. , , 347 A.2d 179, 199-201
(1975) (convicted criminal defendants who refused to cooperate with examining psychiatrists were
incarcerated for contempt, resulting in imprisonment beyond expiration of their original sen-
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predicated specifically on the inadequate due process used to effect a
"confinement that is in fact indeterminate. ' 75 Concurrent with the McNeil
decision, certiorari was granted, and then dismissed for Murel v. Baltimore
77
City Criminal Court,76 which arose under the same Maryland statutes.
Significantly, Justice Douglas dissented, pointing out that the right to liberty
was one of "transcendent value," without which other constitutional rights
"become largely meaningless, ' 78 and thus not susceptible to perfunctory
revocation.
More recently, involuntary civil commitment to a mental institution for
almost fifteen years was challenged in O'Connor v. Donaldson.79 The Court
refrained from considering the broader problem of the state's obligation to
provide treatment for the mentally ill, and stated that "this case raises a
single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every
man's constitutional right to liberty."' 80 In his concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Burger cited Gault for the proposition that confinement, for any
reason, is impermissible without adequate due process. 8 1 His reliance upon
the juvenile delinquency cases, as well as the majority's emphasis on personal
liberty, evidences a grave concern for an individual's personal liberty-despite
society's traditional interests in revoking that liberty. In addition, the Chief
Justice noted.that rehabilitative treatment offered by the state was not a "quid
pro quo"'8 2 for the deprivation of individual liberty. Rather due process
requires "identifying and accommodating [both] the interests of the individual
'8 3
and [of] society.
tences; McNeil distinguished on basis that defendant in that case was ordered confined after their
sentences had expired).
75. Id.at 249.
76. 407 U.S. 355 (1972). The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted since
one petitioner had been released, and the other three were serving fixed sentences. Moreover, the
applicable Maryland statutes were undergoing substantial revision. Id. at 357-58.
77. 407 U.S. at 247.
78. Id. at 363-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Relying on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1958), Justice Douglas noted that there is always a margin of error in any litigation, and
where one party has " 'at stake an interest of transcending value .'.. this margin of error is
reduced . . . by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the

factfinder . . . of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. at 362. Two years earlier, the
majority of the Court had used this language from Speiser to support a reasonable doubt burden
of proof in juvenile adjudications. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Finally, Justice
Douglas relied on Gault and Winship to reject the argument that only "criminal" cases required
such a burden of proof. 407 U.S. at 364.
79. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
80. Id. at 573. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) against the director of
the mental home for wrongfully depriving the inmate of his constitutional right to freedom since
he was not dangerous, and could have lived safely outside the institution. The Court vacated and
remanded the verdict for plaintiff to consider the judge's instructions to the jury. Id. at 577.
81. Id. at 580.
82. Id. at 585.
83. Id. Chief Justice Burger relied upon McKeiver for this proposition. This was an
interesting choice since the Court in that case came close to abandoning the sociological principles
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The due process necessary to incarcerate an individual can be viewed from
two perspectives. One may ask what societal needs or reasons exist for such
incarceration. This approach will allow society's interests to determine the
due process required to deprive someone of his liberty. On the other hand,
one may view the problem from the perspective of what the individual is
losing-his liberty-and ask if society's interests may constitutionally mandate
disparate due process standards. Imprisonment would be more easily justified
when viewed from the broad and generalized needs of society. However the
Supreme Court's position on what is necessary to justify incarcerations for
criminal contempt, juvenile delinquency and mental incompetency appears to
have shifted toward the second approach. Despite the Court's strong language
and reasoning in the other three areas, civil contempt remains rooted in the
first perspective. Strong similarities in all four proceedings make this position
difficult to understand.
The civil-criminal label approach to due process is simplistic, and has
been clearly rejected in the juvenile delinquency cases. The distinction
between civil insanity and criminal insanity "has no relevance whatever in the
context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.""
Yet despite the similarity of the conduct being sanctioned, the "criminal"
contemnor is entitled to the full panoply of procedural safeguards if his
sentence is more than six months, while his "civil" brother lacks the key due
process elements 5 of a jury trial, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding potentially indefinite imprisonment.
Abhorrence of such indefinite imprisonment prompted the imposition of
procedural safeguards in both the juvenile delinquency and mental competency determinations. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is mandated in
order to confine a juvenile.8 6 Even though the juvenile may be released when
rehabilitated, or the incompetent released when sane, the initial incarceration
must be accompanied with substantive due process safeguards. The usual
answer to a civil contemnor on this issue is that he carries the keys to his cell
in his pocket.8 7 While this response may be reasonable in many instances, it is
of little comfort to those contemnors unable to prove their inability to comply.
Just as the most heinous criminal is provided every due process protection,
the civil contemnor should be guaranteed that at some point the complainant
will be required to prove his ability to comply beyond a reasonable doubt.
The revocation of a man's liberty on the same standard of proof which may be
"applicable to the run-of-the-mill automobile negligence actions"881 would
seem constitutionally inconsistent.
behind the juvenile system and implementing the full due process requirements necessary to
revoke an adult criminal defendant's liberty. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra_
84. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, I11 (1966).
85. See Kutner, Contempt Power: The Black Robe-A Proposal for Due Process. 39 Tenn. L_
Rev. 1, 71-72 (1971).
86. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

87.

See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.

88.

Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 359 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

1038

IVol. 44

Both criminal contempt 9 and juvenile delinquency adjudications9" placed
extensive power in the hands of one man. This concentration of power drew
sharp criticism before it was altered. The same is true of sanity determinations, where a psychiatrist's opinion is usually the only relevant evidence
available9 -a fact that led Justice Marshall to laud the jury's role in these
determinations. 92 Yet the power to imprison for civil contempt remains solely
in the hands of the judge. This underlines the punitive aspect of civil
contempt. 93 For while the primary goal is coercive, the contemnor has defied
the power of the court. The thrust of a contempt sentence-civil or
criminal-is focused on the adversity between judge and defendant, making it
difficult to identify the purpose as coercive, punitive, or both. A fine of
$150,000 per day for failure to produce documents smacks of punishment,
despite the contemnor's wealth. 94 Nonpayment resulting in imprisonment that
would eventually force the contemnor's relatives to "ransom""5 him would
seem to be punitive. Locking up a particularly stubborn defendant 96 for years
with no results, cannot be termed solely "coercive."
The reluctance to alter the traditional position on civil contempt sanctions
reflects a desire to preserve the power of the courts to efficiently administer
justice. Without some police power of their own, be it civil or criminal, the
courts would have considerable difficulty with defiant or reluctant defendants. 9 7 Nevertheless, recent events have manifested an uneasiness with the
tenets of civil contempt and their ultimate futility.
89. Justice Black, dissenting in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), saw a judge's
power to summarily punish for criminal contempt as "an anomaly in the law." Id. at 193 (Black,
J., dissenting). He characterized it as " 'nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing
under our form of government.' " Id. at 194. "No official, regardless of his position or the purity
and nobleness of his character, should be granted such autocratic omnipotence." Id. at 198; see
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968);
Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 395 (1957); Burdick, Problems in Contempt, 43 North
Dakota L. Rev. 237, 241-42 (1967).
90. The Star Chamber was compared favorably to the power concentrated in the hands of
juvenile judges. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
91. See Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post-Jackson Analysis, 40 Tenn.
L. Rev. 659, 661 (1973); Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the
Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the
State of New York, 17 Buffalo L. Rev. 651, 660 (1968); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 454, 460 (1967).
92. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
93. See Poster, Limits to the Contempt Power in California Courts, 49 L.A. Bar Bull. 98,
103-04 (1974).

94. IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974); see Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW, Civil No. 75-1611 (4th Cir., Feb.
3, 1976) (fine imposed was too high to be purely remedial).
95. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 64 (1948); In re Bar-Craft Dresses, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 921,
922 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
96. Gerardo Catena flatly refused to testify, saying he'd be carried from prison "feet first"
before he did. Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 229, 343 A.2d 744, 747 (1975) (per curiam); see
Cohen, The Contempt Power-The Lifeblood of the Judiciary, 2 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 69, 90-91
(1971).

97.

It has long been recognized that in order to operate effectively, the courts must have the
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In Catena v. Seidl, 98 the Supreme Court of New Jersey released a man
who, although guaranteed immunity, refused to testify before the State
Commission of Investigation, and was imprisoned for more than five years.
He remained steadfast in his refusal to testify throughout his incarceration. 99
The court expressed the issue in terms of "whether there is a substantial
likelihood that continued confinement will cause Catena to change his mind
and testify."' 0 0 His motive for remaining silent was no longer considered
relevant.' 1 Noting that confinement could not "be used to punish him for
remaining silent or for any other shortcoming of which he has not been
convicted,"' 02 the court found "no substantial likelihood"' 0 3 that coercion
would succeed. This case contravenes civil contempt doctrines, for the
contemnor admittedly had the "keys," but declined to use them. 104 One view
of the decision may be that the court finally turned to Catena, saying "You
win!" However, the court's reliance on a "substantial likelihood" is analogous
to the "substantial probability" test used by the Supreme Court in considering
standards for the commitment of the mentally ill.' 05 The emphasis of the
decision appears to focus on the reason and nature of the imprisonment, and
evidences concern with the indefinite confinement of one not convicted of a
crime.106

It would seem that the court, over the course of five years, changed
positions on the value of Catena's incarceration. What began as a legitimate
exercise of judicial power ended up as a consideration of "[a]ge, state of health
and length of confinement"'10 7 in determining whether imprisonment served
power to compel testimony and to police litigants. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
443-44 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919).
98. 68 N.J. 224, 343 A.2d 744 (1975) (per curiam).

99.
100.

Id. at 229, 343 A.2d at 747.
Id. at 228, 343 A.2d at 747.

101. Id. The dissent maintained that the court's holding would result in a substitution of
"organized crime's oath of silence" for the laws of society. Id. at 230, 343 A.2d at 748 (Schreiber,
J., dissenting).
102.

Id.

at 229, 343 A.2d at 747.

103. Id.
104. Catena, once imprisoned, had the burden of showing that his commitment "had lost its
coercive impact and had become punitive .... "Id. at 227, 343 A.2d at 746. One year earlier, the
same court had ruled that Catena, imprisoned for four years, had not met this burden. Id. at 226,
343 A.2d at 746. The majority made it clear that "confinement for a particular length of time" or
a contemnor's insistence that he would never talk would not "automatically satisfy the requirement of showing 'no substantial likelihood' " that coercion would succeed. New Jersey would
seem to favor a case by case approach "decided on an independent evaluation of all of the
particular facts." Id. at 229, 343 A.2d at 747.
105. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see text accompanying note 71 supra. Yet
Catena, unlike Jackson, was not a mentally ill deaf mute who would never be able to stand trial.
His position was exactly what the law of civil contempt attempts to correct.
106. The only factor that changed throughout Catena's imprisonment was the length of time
he spent in jail. No subsequent events transpired, making him unable to testify. 68 N.J. at 229,
343 A.2d at 747.
107. Id.
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any coercive purpose. The result clearly reflects mistrust of a procedure
which may summarily imprison an individual indefinitely, but the reasoning
cannot be explained in terms of traditional civil contempt principles, and
provides no guidelines to determine when coercion ends and punishment
begins. Thus the case is perhaps best viewed as the inevitable result of a
constitutionally impractical method of depriving an individual of his liberty in
order to achieve a societal goal.
In People ex rel. Feldman v. Warden, 108 the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the civil contempt incarceration for almost two years of a fifty-one
year old woman in poor health. The woman, living in a New York City
communal family for some twenty years, had reared a child with the child's
father. The natural mother, three years after leaving the family, sought
custody of the child who, although twelve or thirteen years old at the time of
the court action, had never attended school. The judge ordered the woman
and the natural father to produce the child in court so as to be able to
determine his well being.' 0 9 They refused, sent the child into hiding, and
were imprisoned in accordance with New York Judiciary Law, section
774(1).110

The trial judge held an extensive hearing, pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the contemnor's continued incarceration. Noting the need
to distinguish coercive and punitive motives, he saw the issue as being
" 'whether or not she has the power to obey the mandate of the Court.' ,,I
Finding that she did, the court ordered her imprisonment. The Appellate
Division upheld the order, stating that the purpose of New York Judiciary
Law section 774(1) was for " 'vindication of the authority of the court and to
compel obedience to its mandate.' "112 The contemnor was not allowed "to
"13
"
bargain and barter with the court on the conditions of her compliance .
On expedited appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment. 114
Due to the national attention this case received," 3 an amendment to section
774 was proposed during the 1975-1976 session of the New York legislature,
in an attempt to limit imprisonment under that section to no more than twelve
108. 46 App. Div. 2d 256, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 846, 331
N.E.2d 691, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975). But cf. Vail v. Quinlan, Civil, No. 74-4773 (S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 7, 1976).
109.

Id.

at 258, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 172.

110. Id. at 258, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 173. The N.Y. Judiciary Law § 774(1) (McKinney 1975)
provides in pertinent part: "Where the misconduct proved consists of an omission to perform an
act or duty, which is yet in the power of the offender to perform, he shall be imprisoned only until
he has performed it ....
111.

46 App. Div. 2d at 257, 362 N.Y.S.2d

at 172.

112. Id. at 258, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 173. The court's language reflects the elusive distinction
between civil and criminal contempt. See 1972 Utah L. Rev. 306.
113. 46 App. Div. 2d at 258-59, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
114.

36 N.Y.2d 846, 331 N.E.2d 691, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975).

115. See Time, Feb. 17, 1975, at 24; Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1975, at 39, col. 1.
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months under any circumstances." 6 The governor vetoed it, because "Fn
effect what the bill does is give an individual the option of either complying
with a court order . . . or spending a maximum of one year in jail." In

addition, the bill would have a "detrimental effect on law enforcement," and
would hinder the power of the courts "to enforce their decrees and

. . .

the

1,117
rights of citizens ....
The Governor's memorandum reflected all the traditional arguments
against limiting civil contempt powers. Analogous arguments were heard in
opposition to changing criminal contempt powers,"18 and the juvenile delinquency system, 119 yet neither area seems to have suffered from constitutional domestication. The Feldman case and the subsequent bill show an
attempt to limit the results of a defective system without curing the source of
the defect.1 20 It would make more sense to allow courts to imprison civil
contemnors conditionally for up to one year at which time the defendant
would be guaranteed a jury trial on the issue of his ability to comply with the
court's order. This would not hamper the court's power to conduct trials or
compel testimony. One year should be a definite deterrent. Moreover, the
flagrant contemnor, like Catena, could not look forward to automatic release
after one year, as proposed by the bill. Similarly, the civil contemnor should
be afforded the same standard of proof as criminal contemnors, "beyond a
reasonable doubt," since there would seem to be no real danger of allowing
future Catenas to escape under this quantum of proof. As in juvenile
delinquency and mental competency adjudications, the answer would seem to
lie in a more rational due process which would allow courts to function
properly, without losing sight of the value of personal liberty.

William A. Austin
116. S. 6791-A, N.Y. Sen., 198th Sess. (1975). The bill would have added to the NY_
Judiciary Law § 774(1) (McKinney 1975) provision that "'where the misconduct proved consists
of an omission to perform an act or duty, which is yet in the power of the offender to perform, he
shall be imprisoned only until he has performed it ... " the restriction that "in no event shall any
person sentenced to a term of imprisonment under this section be required to serve a specific or
cumulative term of more than twelve months."
117. Governor's Memorandum filed with S. 6791-A (Not Approved) (Aug 9. 1975).
118. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
119.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U-S.

1. 24-25 (1967)

120. See Note, Contempt of Court: Go Directly To Jail. Do Not Pass Go. Do Not Collect
Your Constitutional Rights, 7 Suffolk L. Rev. 517, 551-52 (1973).

